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BOOK REVIEW
JUDGING JUDGES. By Preble Stolz. New York, N.Y.: The Free
Press. 1981 Pp 427 & Appendix. Hardbound $19.95.
Reviewed by Peggy Hora*
Preble Stolz, in his recent book, Judging Judges, de-
scribes the press' interest in the investigation into the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's alleged misconduct preceding Chief Jus-
tice Rose Bird's confirmation election: the hearings "were
given .. .probably more talent and space than the general
public's interest in the court's problems warranted."1 The
same could be said about Stolz' investigatory tome.
Judging Judges tells more than anyone would ever want
to know about the Commission on Judicial Performance's
1979 investigation. The Commission investigated allegations
of delay and irregularity in the court's handling of politically
sensitive cases and improper disclosure of confidential infor-
mation prior to release of decisions.' Stolz was unable to dis-
card any detail of investigative finding, no matter how minute,
in this exhaustive inquiry into an event in the history of Cali-
fornia jurisprudence which is unlikely to be repeated.
There is no doubt, however, that Stolz's work is impor-
tant and interesting, at least to those in the legal field. The
significance of the work lies in its effort to sensitize readers to
the issue of the politicization of the court system. Stolz likens
the current ideal of the system to an eighth grade civics class
definition of courts: applying laws using principles of stare de-
© 1982 by Peggy Hora
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1. P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES (1981), 184.
2. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 190 in which the April 20, 1979 Commission on
Judicial Performance passed a resolution defining the scope of its investigation.
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cisis in which the "real world" of competing political interests
does not exist.
Not since the United States Supreme Court's "switch in
time that saved nine"' has the judiciary's political sensitivity
been so public as the Chief Justice and her court's actions
which Stolz records in Judging Judges. Those who wish to
champion the ideal of an independent judiciary will be jolted
from complacency as they are educated about the degree of
outside pressure to which the justices of the Supreme Court
are subject. To illustrate, the mere suggestion that Justice
Matthew O. Tobriner delayed the release of the court's deci-
sion in People v. Tanner4 until after Chief Justice Bird's con-
firmation election is shocking to the reader. In addition, after
hearing testimony for five months on the alleged delay and
related issues, the Commission announced that no formal
charges would be filed against any justice. One of its members,
however, Tom Willoughby, stated, "It's [the Commission's re-
port] not an exoneration just because we did not vote to bring
charges."' Stolz certainly leaves no room for political naivete:
one cannot read the book and remain unworldy.
Despite the excruciating attention paid to every detail,
the work as a whole captures the reader's attention. The
court's inner workings, previously clouded by silence, are dis-
closed for the first time to practicing lawyers, the majority of
whom will never appear before California's highest court.
Readers will be captivated by the inside knowledge Stolz
shares in the same way they might be titilated by gossip tab-
loids. It is not only irritating to read about the bickering and
backbiting in which the justices engage' but painful to think
of the ultimate harm to the court system. Stolz points out: "If
Supreme Court justices persistently talk about their col-
leagues as if they were unprincipled fools, the message eventu-
3. President Franklin Roosevelt's 1937 court packing plan was abandoned when
Justice Roberts switched his position to become part of the 5:4 majority upholding
New Deal legislation.
4. 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) on reh'g 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 450 (1979).
5. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 395.
6. It is interesting to note that in his retirement interview in the State Bar of
California's publication Matthew 0. Tobriner states, "Since [Justice William] Clark
left the Court, we have had very little in the way of differences." California Lawyer
Feb. 82 at 49.
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ally will trickle down the judicial hierarchy."'7
Although Stolz takes all the actors in this drama to task,
the Chief Justice is singled out for special vitriol. It can be
said that at least two justices (Clark and Mosk) behaved un-
professionally during the Tanner affair. Stolz never attacks
them in the same way or with the same intensity with which
he attacks Rose Bird. Senator H. L. Richardson, chair of the
Law and Order Campaign Committee formed in June of 1978
to defeat the Chief in her confirmation election, telephoned
Justice Clark the day before the election and asked if Clark
would talk to reporters about the Tanner case and Richard-
son's allegations of delay.8 Justice Clark took three calls from
the press on the day before the election, including one in
which the Los Angeles Times election-day article, which
charged delay in the release of the Tanner decision, was read
to Clark. At the Commission hearing Clark testified that he
realized he was one of the two justices referred to in the arti-
cle as having confirmed the allegation of delay.' Justice Stan-
ley Mosk also spoke to the press on election eve and failed to
deny that Tanner, which struck down the so-called "use a
gun, go to prison" legislation, was being delayed."0 To com-
pound matters Justice Clark refused to sign a statement ab-
solving Justice Tobriner from any impropriety in handling the
Tanner matter.1 From this, Stolz concludes that no one was
blameless: "Tobriner (and presumably Mosk [!]) should have
said straight out that Tanner was not being delayed ...
Clark should have said nothing or something, not hidden in
ambiguous silence."3
Though Stolz chastises Mosk and Clark for speaking to
the press, he faults Bird for being unavailable to them.8 The
Chief Justice cannot escape Stolz's displeasure, regardless of
her actions.
Judging Judges begins by dissecting Bird's concurring
7. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 409.
8. Richardson admitted he had no real evidence to support his allegations but
only a "subjective judgment." P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 126 citing NEW WEST, Nov.
19, 1979 at 127.
9. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 130.
10. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 135.
11. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 141-45.
12. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 135-36.
13. Id.
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opinion in the Caudillo" decision. He suggests that she did
not read the majority opinion carefully and observes that she
may lack "the intellectual power to see the opinion's flaws or
she was being hypocritical. '"1 5 Stolz proceeds to accuse her of
writing a concurring opinion for political purposes, "Perhaps
Bird wrote a separate opinion because she thought that the
Caudillo result-rape is not great bodily injury-was bound
to become an issue in her campaign."' 6 He grudgingly adds
that the "most creditable motivation" for writing a separate
opinion was her desire to change what she saw as bad legisla-
tion. The attempt was successful since the legislature
amended the penal code section before the election. 17 By con-
trast, Bernard Jefferson, sitting on the court by assignment,
escapes personal attack on his mental abilities; although Stolz
finds his majority opinion lengthy and logically flawed,18 his
writing style is not reduced to being labelled banal as is the
Chief's.1
In the case which sustained the validity of Proposition
13,20 Stolz describes the Chief's dissent as "puzzling,""' find-
ing her opinion ineffective and based on outdated law." Stolz
adds that the decision to dissent in the case was an action
that seemed "independent and courageous."'i He concludes,
however, that "she thought she was going to lose the election
... and she might have wished, perhaps unconsciouly, to
leave some trace that would explain her defeat; no one wants
to be a martyr without a cause."'"
When actually confronted with political influence on the
court, rather than his conjecture into the subconscious, Stolz
fails to recognize its import. In Tanner II,25 where Clark's
Tanner P' dissent is reworked into the majority opinion,'7
14. People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d 562, 580 P.2d 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978).
15. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 26.
16. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 27.
17. Id.
18. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 20-25.
19. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 115.
20. Amador Valley High School v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
21. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 31.
22. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 32.
23. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 31.
24. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 32 (emphasis added).
25. 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
26. 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) (reh'g granted).
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Stolz is outraged by the fact that the court has essentially re-
versed itself in a few months time in response to public out-
cry. Justice Frank Newman's Tanner II concurrence calls the
Bird recall campaign the previous fall "shrill" and
"clamourous" and "inspired and nurtured by experienced,
well-financed, ambitious, and posse-like 'hard on crime' advo-
cates . . . ."8 It is apparent Tanner II is a political decision,
but its author escapes Stolz's criticism in a way Bird does not.
Moreover, instead of decrying the political manipulation of
the court, Stolz tells the reader the lesson to be learned from
Tanner II: opinions are better if written collectively.2 9
The Chief Justice's management style receives particular
attention in Judging Judges. Stolz finds Bird to be "an inept
politician who preferred to rely on the power of her position
rather than her ability to persuade colleagues."30 The author
finds the way her predecessor broke up the old boy system
"acceptable"8 1 whereas Stolz finds that the Chief "relied en-
tirely on naked legal authority for reasons that were
obscure." 8
In Judging Judges, Rose Bird was damned if she did,
damned if she didn't. For example, the Chief, for the first
time in history, appointed trial court judges to sit pro tern on
the Supreme Court. Stolz says:
Bird made this kind of nonsense a major target in her ad-
ministration and publicized symbolic steps such as as-
signing for the first time a municipal court judge to sit
pro tern on the Supreme Court. The question has to be
asked whether the problem was worth so much
attention. .... .
Stolz misses the point; it is the symbolism itself that was
important to both the trial and appellate benches. Judges, like
all of us, are conscious of status. Appellate justices are more
revered than trial judges, just as superior court judges have
higher status than the municipal court bench. The elevation
27. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 239.
28. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 240 quoting People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d at 546,
596 P.2d at 347, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 469 (Newman, J., concurring).
29. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 245.
30. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 104.
31. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 105.
32. Id.
33. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 106.
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of the "lowest" judge to an appellate position breaks down the
judicial class barriers which improves, rather than inhibits,
communication and cooperation between the levels of the ju-
diciary. Appellate justices who may have been directly ap-
pointed can enjoy the perspective of the trial court and vice
versa. The problem was worth the attention it was given by
the Chief.
To understand Judging Judges, one must evaluate Stolz's
political consciousness. Amid the hostility Stolz describes so
well, he fails to see the importance of reasons other than
Bird's alleged poor administration for the difficulties with her
colleagues. Stolz missed the point; as the first woman on the
court, one without judicial experience and who was only forty
years old when appointed, she was faced with tremendous ob-
stacles to overcome before her leadership could become legiti-
mate. Justice Mosk was not promoted to the chief position
and "his bitter disappointment was widely known. '3 4 She
faced the task of balancing a show of strength to prove her
leadership with compassion to show her humanity. In this
lose/lose situation, Stolz never gives her respite other than a
concession that her greatest virtue is "exceptional conscien-
tiousness and hard work." ' Stolz's conclusion that "Bird's sex
and [Justice Wiley] Manuel's race added nothing toward mak-
ing the court's collective product stronger" 86 ignores the exis-
tence of racism and sexism in society. Just as it is symbolicly
important for trial judges to sit on the appellant bench, it is
equally important for women and minorities to hold powerful,
visible positions. It is also indisputable that a woman or a
black in a formerly all white male institution brings a unique
perspective which cannot help but enrich the collective prod-
uct and process. Stolz's blind spot in this regard makes one
wonder how far his view of women has evolved since his un-
dergraduate days which he spent "pursuing skirts.
'3 7
34. Lewis, Foreward to P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at xvi.
35. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 113.
36. P. STOLZ, supra note 1, at 423.
37. When asked to explain his less than sterling undergraduate record com-
pared to his excellent law school performance, Stolz said, "That may have been be-
cause I got married and was no longer pursuing skirts." Profile, Los Angeles Daily
Journal, Dec. 29, 1981, at 1.
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